Key Insights:
- Federal officials could reveal a workable budget-neutral acquisition mechanism.
- Congress could advance legislation authorizing a statutory Bitcoin purchasing program.
- Interest rates and dollar strength could outweigh reserve-related supply effects.
The direct purchase of U.S. government bitcoins is unlikely to occur before the end of President Donald Trump’s term, according to the rules of Strategic Bitcoin Reserve. While the statement by Gracy Chen, the CEO of Bitget, suggests that crypto is well on its way to legalization in Washington, that reality isn’t the case for active accumulation, which is constrained by legal and budgetary reasons, according to Chen.
The reserve is established as a result of Trump’s March 6, 2025 executive order on the federal government- controlled Bitcoin. The policy, however, did not result in a taxpayer-funded purchasing program, but instead established a holding framework.
Reserve rules narrow the government’s options
The Strategic Bitcoin Reserve primarily holds Bitcoin obtained through criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings. The executive order requires Treasury-controlled reserve Bitcoin to remain unsold, subject to limited legal exceptions.
The administration also directed Treasury and Commerce officials to examine additional Bitcoin acquisition strategies. However, those methods must remain budget-neutral and impose no extra costs on taxpayers.
That requirement creates the central obstacle identified by Chen. Regular market purchases would represent a much larger federal policy decision. Congress could also need to authorize spending or approve changes involving federal assets.
Chen therefore sees little chance of direct purchases during Trump’s remaining term. Her assessment separates the administration’s supportive crypto messaging from the reserve’s actual legal structure.
Public estimates of federal Bitcoin holdings also vary significantly. Some estimates place reserve-related holdings near 198,000 BTC. Other trackers count more than 328,000 BTC across government-linked wallets.
The difference reflects an important ownership issue. Seized Bitcoin does not automatically become federal property. Courts can order restitution, returns to victims, or other distributions before final forfeiture.
No-sell policy changes Bitcoin’s supply outlook
The Strategic Bitcoin Reserve still carries significant market consequences without purchasing additional coins. Its strongest effect comes from reducing potential government selling pressure.
Before Trump created the reserve, federal authorities regularly disposed of confiscated Bitcoin. The US Marshals Service conducted auctions involving cryptocurrency acquired through major criminal cases.
Administration officials later argued that earlier Bitcoin sales sacrificed billions of dollars in potential gains. Trump’s order changed that approach by establishing a long-term holding policy.
Consequently, reserve Bitcoin no longer represents the same potential supply overhang for traders. Removing a large holder from routine selling can strengthen scarcity expectations.
However, reduced supply differs fundamentally from new demand. Treasury purchases would inject fresh capital into Bitcoin markets. A no-sale policy simply keeps existing government-controlled coins away from potential buyers.
That distinction weakens expectations of a government-driven demand surge.
Chen links Bitcoin outlook to macro conditions
Chen also expects broader financial conditions to influence Bitcoin more heavily than reserve policy. She cited interest rates as a major factor during a recent Trade Secrets podcast appearance.
Bitcoin has become increasingly connected with traditional financial markets, according to Chen. Therefore, higher rates could pressure cryptocurrency valuations alongside other risk assets.
She expects Bitcoin to remain within a relatively broad range around current levels through year-end. Her forecast allows movement roughly $10,000 to $20,000 above or below prevailing prices.
Meanwhile, institutional demand remains another important force. Spot Bitcoin exchange-traded funds have expanded regulated access to the asset. Corporate treasury strategies have also increased Bitcoin exposure among publicly traded companies.
Congressional action remains the key wild card
The administration has not completely closed the door to additional acquisitions. Rather, officials can seek strategies that do not impose more costs on taxpayers.
One idea has been to revalue federal gold certificates which have been issued at a statutory price much lower than the market rate. However, changing the accounting discrepancy into funding in the form of Bitcoin would trigger legal and political issues.
Congress has also introduced a bill that will allow for bigger federal ownership of Bitcoin. The BITCOIN Act proposes to buy one million BTC over five years by Senator Cynthia Lummis.
Other suggestions have concentrated more on long-term periods of investment. None has set up a regular schedule for buying bitcoin in the federal system.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also made it clear in 2025 that the growth of reserves would continue to be driven by confiscations. That stance reinforced the notion that direct buying would not be in the foreseeable future.
The Strategic Bitcoin Reserve is then not as much an engine for the sovereigns to accumulate bitcoins, but rather a policy for supply management. It decreases potential for liquidation, but depends on institutions, corporations, investors and macro-economic conditions for future demand.
That difference turns the investment story for Bitcoin markets upside down. Washington has agreed to keep eligible coins, but has not agreed to spend taxpayer money for additional coins.
Conclusion
Chen’s assessment highlights the gap between political enthusiasm and executable policy. The US government can retain forfeited Bitcoin while exploring cost-neutral acquisition methods. Yet direct purchases would require far greater political and legislative support.
For investors, the reserve provides a clearer supply signal than a demand catalyst. Its immediate importance rests on what Washington will not sell, rather than what it might buy.
